Case No. S262032

In the Supreme Court of the State of California

GREGORY GEISER,
Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent,
v.

PETER KUHNS, et al.
Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants.

AFTER A DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE, CASE NO. B279738
SUPERIOR COURT OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
CASE NOS. BS161018, BS161019 & BS161020
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ARMEN TAMZARIAN

Reply in Support of Petition for Review

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Introduction

As Petitioners Peter Kuhns, Pablo Caamal, and Mercedes Caamal set forth in their Petition for Review, a two-Justice majority below found that the anti-SLAPP statute, Civ. Code Proc. § 425.16, did not apply to a lawsuit over a public protest against a developer attended by more than two dozen people. A third Justice dissented, warning the "upshot of the majority's [opinion] . . . is that . . . the venerable American tradition of peaceful public protest . . . is left diminished by a well-funded litigation scheme seeking to suppress it." (Dis. Opn. at p. 12.)

This Court accepted review the first time the majority reached this conclusion. But after this Court ordered reconsideration in light of *FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc.* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (*FilmOn*), the majority essentially reissued its original opinion with a short addendum.[1]

Geiser's Answer does not meaningfully respond to the Petition's arguments. And it does not engage with, or even mention, the dissenting opinion below. Instead, Geiser argues that dozens of people protesting a developer for his business practices is too attenuated from an issue of public interest to receive the anti-SLAPP statute's protection and stresses the opinion's nonpublication.

The majority opinion threatens protestors, undermines *FilmOn*'s framework, and cripples the anti-SLAPP statute. This Court should grant review.

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[1] Of the majority's 6,931-word opinion, only 360 words—just 5% of the total—are devoted to analysis in light of *FilmOn*.

Argument

I. Review Is Necessary to Secure Uniformity of Decision on the anti-SLAPP Statute's Application to Public Protest

Geiser argues there is no split of authority that justifies review. (Answer, pp. 14, 24.) But, as shown in the Petition, there is such a split: the majority opinion conflicts with all other decisions applying the anti-SLAPP statute to public protests.

The Petition identified this split in detail. (Petition, pp. 39–41, citing *Thomas v. Quintero* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 653–655; *Lam v. Ngo* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 837; *Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1241, 1246; *City of L.A. v. Animal Def. League* (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 606, 620–621; *Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1144.)

Geiser's Answer simply ignores it.

In their amicus curiae letter in support of the Petition, several diverse advocacy organizations—including the ACLU of Southern California, Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation—outline the threat that the majority opinion's approach presents to their advocacy and to public protest generally. Before the majority's opinion, the unanimous precedent applying the anti-SLAPP statute to public protest assured these groups that the statute protected their organizing efforts. The majority opinion upended that assurance.

The majority opinion injects confusion into this precedent on the anti-SLAPP statute's application to participation in a public protest. Review is needed to resolve this split in authority.

II. Review Is Necessary to Settle the Important Question of How Courts Should Define the Public Issue When Assessing an anti-SLAPP Motion

Geiser's Answer does not respond in any meaningful way to Kuhns' and the Caamals' central argument that the majority's framing of the issue in the narrowest possible way created its own conclusion that made the second part of the *FilmOn* analysis superfluous. As Kuhns and the Caamals stressed repeatedly in their Petition, the majority's insistence on framing the issue narrowly and singularly ignores *FilmOn*'s instruction "that speech is rarely 'about' any single issue." (*FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) The majority opinion threatens a regression to the state of the law before *FilmOn*, where courts too often decided whether the anti-SLAPP statute applied based simply on how they framed the issue. As Kuhns and the Caamals stressed, the majority opinion is not the only opinion to have tossed off *FilmOn*'s framework in the short time since this Court issued the decision. (Petition, pp. 28–29.)

Geiser and the majority's narrow framing fails to address the participation of dozens of other people with no financial or other discernable connection to the Caamals' property in the protest outside Geiser's home. And it fails to even account for Kuhns' role as a defendant in Geiser's litigation.

Geiser argues that existing authority is sufficient to establish what constitutes a matter of public interest, Answer, pp. 17–18, but relies on *World Financial Group, Inc. v. HBW Ins. & Financial Services, Inc.* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1561 (*World Financial*), for this proposition. (Answer, pp.17–18.) *World Financial* is one of the three cases *FilmOn expressly disapproved* as providing too narrow of a perspective on determining the issue. (*Filmon*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 149.) Geiser's Answer exposes his own argument's weakness.

The lower courts need guidance to prevent further backsliding on the anti-SLAPP statute's protection.

A. Defining the Issue at a Particularized Level of Generalization Threatens the anti-SLAPP Statute's Protection

Geiser asserts the anti-SLAPP statute should not protect Kuhns and the Caamals because "'[a]t a sufficiently high level of generalization, any conduct can appear rationally related to a broader issue of public importance.'" (Answer, p. 18, quoting *Rand Res., LLC v. City of Carson* (2019) 6 Cal. 5th 610, 625.) But the inverse is also true: at a sufficiently granular level of generalization, any dispute can cynically be cast as only involving the direct participants. John Scopes might be said to have had a personal dispute with his employer, the Dayton, Tennessee school district, over the material he taught in his high school science class. Or Rosa Parks a personal dispute with a Montgomery City Lines bus conductor. Given the anti-SLAPP statute's command to construe the statute's protection broadly, Code Civ. Proc.

§ 425.16, subd. (a), guarding against such granular framing is at least as important as guarding against framing the issue at a high level of generalization.

That the genesis of the events giving rise to Geiser's lawsuits was a dispute between the Caamals and Geiser's company does not decide the statute's protection. Plenty of disputes that begin as personal spill into the collective consciousness. Lucia Evans, a former aspiring actress, accused a movie producer of sexual assault and sparked a worldwide reckoning on workplace sexual harassment. (See Farrow, *From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein's Accusers Tell Their Stories*, The New Yorker (Oct. 23, 2017) <http://goo.gl/bzR1mZ> [as of June 19, 2020].) A white woman's dispute with a black family barbequing in an Oakland park generated more than two-million views on YouTube, sparked weeks-long national news stories, and led to hundreds of people attending a "BBQing While Black" protest/cookout attended by political candidates. (See Mezzofiore, *A white woman called police on black people barbecuing. This is how the community responded*, CNN (May 22, 2018) <https://cnn.it/2rYKqtm> [as of June 19, 2020].) A transgender teenager's dispute with his high school over which bathroom he uses became a national debate, including sparring material for Republican candidates for the 2016 Republican Presidential nomination. (See Balingit, *Gavin Grimm just wanted to use the bathroom. He didn't think the nation would debate it*, Washington Post (Aug. 30, 2016)

<https://wapo.st/2bA7XL0> [as of June 19, 2020].) Thousands of other examples abound.

The public frequently understands abstract concepts or policy through individual narrative. People are more naturally drawn to human drama than they are to abstraction. That is why people have told stories this way for centuries: crystallizing policy debates by beginning with individual conflicts, providing context through anecdotes and storytelling, then springboarding to broader levels of abstraction that readers can better understand through the lens of human experience. This concept is at the heart of narrative storytelling's primary rule: show, don't tell.

The Caamals' dispute with Geiser's company expanded beyond the direct participants. It expanded to ensnare Kuhns, a housing rights organizer with no connection to the property, who found himself a defendant in Geiser's litigation. It expanded to include a couple of dozen protesters who turned out to a weeknight demonstration on a few hours' notice. And it generated at least eleven articles in media from a variety of formats and diverse perspectives, detailing the Caamals' dispute with Geiser and his company. (See Petition, p. 12–16, collecting media coverage.)

It is true that defendants in some cases attempt to fit "their narrow dispute" within the anti-SLAPP statute "by its slight reference to the broader public issue." (*FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 152 [rejecting this "'synecdoche theory' of public interest"].) But heavy-handed application of the rule against the synecdoche theory threatens the statute's protection. This case does not

involve self-published statements based on the speakers' own judgment of the importance of their cause. (See, e.g., *Rivero v. Am. Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924–929 (*Rivero*) [union's self-published pamphlets distributed to their membership were not in connection with an issue of public interest, distinguishing facts from case in which magazine independently reported on an issue and speech was not merely self-published]; *Weinberg v. Feisel* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128–1129 [coin collector's letters describing the plaintiff as a thief, with no other coverage, were not made in connection with an issue of public interest].) Rather, multiple news outlets independently reported on the issue, reflecting informed professional judgments about what the public is interested in, and tying the specific issue facing the Caamals to the broader public issues related to the foreclosure crisis.

This Court should grant review to establish standards to protect the anti-SLAPP statute from the threat of courts framing issues overly narrowly.

B. This Court Should Grant Review to Clarify that the Defendant's Framing of the Issue Is Entitled to Deference

In their Petition, Kuhns and the Caamals suggested a simple solution to the problem of courts evading *FilmOn*'s framework by narrowly defining the issue at the outset: require courts to give deference to the defendant's framing of the issue. (Petition, pp. 32–35.) Deference would relieve courts of the need to perform interpretive acrobatics to determine "what the

challenged speech is really 'about.'" (*FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) Instead, courts should look to the content of the defendant's speech to confirm it is connected to the defendant's identified issue before proceeding to the contextual analysis to determine whether the speech furthered the public conversation about the issue. As Kuhns and the Caamals noted in their Petition, there is little downside to this approach because attempts to manufacture an issue post-hoc would be easily smoked out in the second part of the *FilmOn* analysis. (Petition, p. 34.)

Such deference appears implicit in this Court's practice. It accepted the issues as the defendants framed them in both *FilmOn* and *Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 901 (*Wilson*). (See Petition, p. 33.) And the cases this Court criticized in *FilmOn* for "striv[ing] to discern what the challenged speech is really 'about,'" gave no deference to the defendant's framing of the issues and instead adopted the plaintiff's narrow framing. (*FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149, citing *Bikkina v. Mahadevan* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 70, 85; *World Financial*, *supra*, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1572; *Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.* (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 111.)

Geiser counters that "there is no rule in existing Anti-SLAPP jurisprudence . . . that the Court must grant deference to a moving party's framing of the issue." (Answer, p. 19.) Geiser is correct—there is no explicit rule. But this is a reason to grant review, not deny it.

This Court should grant review to make explicit that the *FilmOn* framework requires deference to the defendant's identification of the public issue.

C. While Media Interest Was Not "*Ex Post Facto*," Later Media Interest Can Reveal Public Interest.

Geiser waves away the media attention around this dispute by asserting that "*the ex post facto* media attention a matter receives does not create an issue of public interest or otherwise convert the purely private dispute into one of public interest." (Answer, p. 18.) Geiser both misrepresents the facts and misstates the law.

The most significant media attention predated the March 30, 2016, protest outside Geiser's residence. The first La Opinión article ran more than three months earlier, on December 17, 2015. (*Familia logra parar el desalojo y tiene oportunidad de recuperar su hogar*, La Opinión (Dec. 17, 2015) <https://bit.ly/2YyMZ6z> [as of June 20, 2020], cited at 1 JA 75, 129, 183.) The second was six days before the protest. (Martínez Ortega, *'De aquí no me sacan más que arrestado' advierte dueño de casa al borde del desalojo*, La Opinión (Mar. 24, 2016) <https://bit.ly/3c6weDJ> [as of June 20, 2020], cited at 3 JA 731.) And the Huffington Post article ran two days before the eviction and the protest outside Geiser's house. (Dreier, *A Working Class Family Battles a 'Fix and Flip' Real Estate Tycoon* Huffington Post (Mar. 28, 2016) <https://bit.ly/2xyZt2Q> [as of June 20, 2020], cited at 1 JA 75, 129, 183.) Each of these three articles pre-

dated Geiser suing Kuhns and the Caamals. They were not *ex post facto*; they were *ex ante*.

Even so, articles published after an incident that prompts a lawsuit still reveal the public's interest. In *Wilson*, for instance, this Court cited two newspaper articles to show that the public took interest in former Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca's retirement, including one that post-dated CNN firing Wilson by more than three years. (*Wilson*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 901, citing Mather & Sewell, *Sheriff Lee Baca's retirement: 'Very shocking and very surprising,'* L.A. Times (Jan. 7, 2014); Stevens, *Ex-Los Angeles Sheriff Lee Baca Is Sentenced to 3 Years in Prison*, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2017); *Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 822, 827 [showing CNN fired Wilson on January 28, 2014].) *Wilson*'s reliance on the May 12, 2017 article to establish there was public interest in the issue shows that subsequent and continued media interest is evidence of the public's interest in an issue.

Geiser's proposed *ex post facto* rule[2] would deny the statute's protection to whistleblowers or breaking news journalists who alert an ignorant public to issues they later show

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[2] Geiser relies on *Carver v. Bonds* (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 328, 354, to support his argument that this Court should disregard the media attention this dispute generated, but his citation is to a discussion of whether the plaintiff was a public figure on the merits of a defamation claim on the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Answer at 18.) The court in *Carver* only reached that step two issue because there *was a public issue* on the first step. (*Carver*, *supra*, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 342–344.) *Carver* does support Geiser's argument.

great interest in. The anti-SLAPP statute should not only protect those who follow up on stories of public interest, but those who break them as well.

These articles were not self-published statements based on the speakers' own judgment of the importance of their cause. (See, e.g., *Rivero*, *supra*, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 924–929; *Weinberg*, *supra*, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1128–1129.) These were eleven articles across various formats detailing the Caamals' dispute with Geiser and his company. Such publications make their living from knowing what is of public interest—that they chose to cover the story shows its significance.

This was an issue the public took interest in.

D. There Is No "Defendant Spoke First" Defense to an anti-SLAPP Motion

Geiser also—with no citation to the record—accuses Kuhns and the Caamals of "creat[ing their] own defense" by seeking publicity around the dispute. (Answer, p 18.) The only evidence in the record that shows any party seeking publicity around this issue involves Geiser's attempts to smear Kuhns and the Caamals through press releases and placing articles in Breitbart News. (3 JA 732; 5 JA 1348; Petition, pp. 16–17.)

But even if the record showed that Kuhns and the Caamals had promoted the Caamals' story to the media, there is no "you spoke first" defense to an anti-SLAPP motion. Most SLAPP defendants will have spoken first. When a developer sues people who organize opposition to a project, *FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 143, the protesting citizens are the ones who speak first.

Geiser's proposed rule stripping a person of anti-SLAPP protections if they had any involvement in putting the issue into the public consciousness would leave countless potential defendants without the statute's protection—people who describe workplace sexual harassment, victims of child molestation, and those who have been ripped off by some unknown consumer scam. The statute's protections are not that narrow.

E. The Recency of the *FilmOn* Decision Is No Reason to Deny Review

Contrary to Geiser's assertion, the relative recency of the *FilmOn* decision does not counsel against review here. As explained in the Petition, the majority here is not the only court that have undermined the *FilmOn* framework by hewing to earlier precedent. As here, *Jeppson v. Ley* (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 845, *Ghiassi v. Bagheri* (July 17, 2019) No. H042939, 2019 WL 3213854, and *Serova v. Sony Music Entm't* (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 103, each strictly applied the so-called categories of matters of public interest delineated in *Rivero* at the expense of the *FilmOn* framework. (Petition, p. 28–29.)

This Court's second grant of review in *Serova*—another case that was initially remanded to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of *FilmOn*—also dashes Geiser's recency argument. (*Serova v. Sony Music Entm't*, review granted Apr. 22, 2020, S260736.)

Disharmony happens quickly when lower courts refuse to follow this Court's precedent.

III. This Court Should Grant Review Because the Majority Opinion Threatens Media Protection

Geiser also fails to meaningfully respond to Kuhns' and the Caamals' contention that the majority's approach threatens media entities that report on these kinds of disputes. (Petition, pp. 42–42.)

One need only imagine that rather than sue Kuhns and the Caamals, Geiser sued La Opinión or the Huffington Post for publishing articles providing critical perspectives of his company's handling of its dispute with the Caamals. There is little doubt that any court would find an issue of public interest if Geiser sought to silence multiple media outlets instead of the protesters he targeted instead. But the *issue here is identical* to the issue the media reported. The result should not be different because the defendants' speech—an evening protest outside a residence—might not sit as well as journalists objectively reporting the news. (See *FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150 ["ultimately, our inquiry does not turn on a normative evaluation of the substance of the speech. We are not concerned with the social utility of the speech at issue, or the degree to which it propelled the conversation in any particular direction; rather, we examine whether a defendant — through public or private speech or conduct — participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest."].)

Geiser simply contends that comparing protesters to the media who report on protests "is not an 'apples-to-apples' comparison" because the content and the context are different.

(Answer, p. 23.) Geiser might be right that the media's dissemination to a large audience might be stronger evidence that speech is made "in connection" with the defined issue when weighing the contextual factors in the second part of the *FilmOn* analysis, but Kuhns' and the Caamals' point is that courts never get there if they frame the issue narrowly at *FilmOn*'s first step. If the issue is—as the majority found—the purely personal dispute between Geiser and the Caamals, the media's audience and reach do not matter because even if they are made "in connection" with that issue, the issue has been predetermined to not be one the public took interest in. In other words, having an audience of one versus and audience of a million is irrelevant if the issue itself is not one of public interest.

Geiser's formulation of the rule as one where the media who reported on this dispute would be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute while the protesters themselves are not would be a surprising result to the legislators who drafted the anti-SLAPP statute. The law was not designed mainly to protect the media. Instead, "[t]he anti-SLAPP law was enacted to protect nonprofit corporations and common citizens from large corporate entities and trade associations in petitioning government." (*FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 143, citation and internal quotations marks omitted.) "In the paradigmatic SLAPP suit, a well-funded developer limits free expression by imposing litigation costs on citizens who protest, write letters, and distribute flyers in opposition to a local project." (*Ibid*., citing Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.)

as amended June 23, 1997, pp. 2–3; Barker, *Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problems of SLAPPs* (1993) 26 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 395, 396). Such "well-heeled parties" can "afford to misuse the civil justice system to chill the exercise of free speech" by frightening speakers of limited means with costly and unfamiliar legal process and the threat of astronomical judgments. (*Ibid*., citing Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1296, *supra*, p. 3.) The legislators who passed the anti-SLAPP statute sought to protect the speech of impecunious protesters, not the (themselves often well-heeled) media entities that report on their activities.

This Court should grant review because the majority's approach threatens not only the demonstrators who criticize well-heeled developers, but also media that cover such protests.

IV. Nonpublication Should Not Shield the Majority Opinion from Review

Geiser's Answer stresses the opinion below's nonpublication a dozen times. The opinion's unpublished status should not immunize it from this Court's review.

A rigid norm against granting review of unpublished decisions creates significant risks. In the federal system, for instance, past and present Justices of the United States Supreme Court have expressed concerns that lower courts abuse the nonpublication vehicle to reach results-driven outcomes that evade review. Justice Stevens once noted that he "tend[ed] to vote to grant more on unpublished opinions, on the theory that occasionally judges will use the unpublished opinion as a device

to reach a decision that might be a little hard to justify." (Cole & Bucklo, *A Life Well Lived: An Interview with Justice John Paul Stevens* (2006) 32 Litig. 8, 67.) Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter warned in a dissent from the denial of certiorari that "[n]onpublication must not be a convenient means to prevent review." (*Smith v. United States* (1991) 502 U.S. 1017, 1019–1020 & n.* (dis. opn. of Blackmun, O'Connor & Souter, JJ.).) And Justice Thomas lamented at some length about this trend in a case with echoes of this one—a lengthy majority opinion over a dissent:

> True enough, the decision below is unpublished and therefore lacks precedential force . . . *But that in itself is yet another disturbing aspect of the [lower court's] decision, and yet another reason to grant review*. The Court of Appeals had full briefing and argument . . . It analyzed the claim in a 39-page opinion written over a dissent. By any standard . . . this decision should have been published. . . . It is hard to imagine a reason that the Court of Appeals would not have published this opinion except to avoid creating binding law for the Circuit.

(*Plumley v. Austin* (2015) 574 U.S. 1127, 1131–1132 (dis. opn. of Thomas, J., citations omitted, italics added).)

Here the Court of Appeal not only had full briefing and argument, it had two rounds of it. Briefing in those two rounds came in at more than 200 pages. Even after this Court instructing the Court of Appeal to reconsider its decision, and the Court of Appeal being one of the first to apply *FilmOn*, the majority still left the opinion unpublished. The opinion here appears to meet at least five of the independent standards for publication: it "[a]pplies an existing rule of law to a set of facts

significantly different from those stated in published opinions," "[a]dvances a new interpretation, clarification, criticism, or construction of a provision of a constitution, statute, ordinance, or court rule," "creates an apparent conflict in the law, "[i]nvolves a legal issue of continuing public interest," and "[i]s accompanied by a separate opinion concurring or dissenting on a legal issue, and publication of the majority and separate opinions would make a significant contribution to the development of the law." (Cal. Rule of Court, rule 8.1105(c)(2), (c)(4), (c)(5), (c)(6) & (c)(9).)

Nonpublication has not blunted the real-world effects of the majority's opinion, either. As both amicus curiae letters supporting review make clear, organizations involved in issues from housing rights to environmentalism to civil rights to international human rights all share concerns about the majority's approach and the chilling effect it could have on public participation on any number of issues.

While the Court's task of securing uniformity requires it focus its review mostly on published decisions, the Court should not allow nonpublication as a tool for one-off results that evade scrutiny. The Court should reject Geiser's heavy reliance on the unpublished nature of the majority opinion.

Conclusion

The majority's opinion and approach threatens all public participation and the very protections of the anti-SLAPP statute and will recur without further guidance from this Court.

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of June, 2020.

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By: /s/ Matthew Strugar

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Certificate of Word Count

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.504(d), the text of this brief, including footnotes and excluding the caption page, table of contents, table of authorities, the signature blocks, and this Certificate, consists of 4,196 words in 13-point Century Schoolbook type as counted by the Microsoft Word word-processing program used to generate the text.

Dated this 19th day of June, 2020.

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Proof of Service

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2910, Los Angeles, California 90010.

On June 19, 2020, I served true copies of this Reply in Support of Petition for Review on the interested parties in this action as follows:

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on June 19, 2020 at Los Angeles, California.

Matthew Strugar

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California

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Case Number: **S262032**
Lower Court Case Number: **B279738**

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