# Case No. S _____

Court of Appeal Case No. E065029
Superior Court No. INF1302723

# In the Supreme Court
OF THE
# State of California

---

**THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,**
*Plaintiff and Respondent,*

vs.

**HENRY ARSENIO LARA II,**
*Defendant and Appellant.*

---

# PETITION FOR REVIEW

---

**Of The Decision of the Court of Appeal**
**Fourth Appellate District, Division Two**

**JULIE SULLWOLD**
Attorney at Law
State Bar No. 12501
315 Meigs Rd., Ste. A-187
Santa Barbara, California 93109
805-564-7618 (telephone)
805-564-7619 (facsimile)
sullwold125012@gmail.com

(By appointment of the Court of Appeal under the
Appellate Defenders, Inc. independent case program)
**Attorney for Appellant, Henry Arsenio Lara II**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

**Page**

*Cases*

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
*(Continued)*

**Page**

### *California Statutes*



### *California Constitution*



### *California Rules of Court*



### *Treatises and Secondary Sources*

# Case No. S _____

Court of Appeal Case No. E065029
Superior Court No. INF1302723

# In the Supreme Court
OF THE
# State of California

---

**THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,**
*Plaintiff and Respondent,*

vs.

**HENRY ARSENIO LARA II,**
*Defendant and Appellant.*

---

# PETITION FOR REVIEW

---

**Of The Decision of the Court of Appeal**
**Fourth Appellate District, Division Two**

---

Appellant Henry Arsenio Lara II respectfully petitions for review following the unpublished decision of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, filed on July 19, 2017.

Because this Court granted review in *People v. Page* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 714, review granted January 27, 2016, S230793 which

presents Mr. Lara's question, Mr. Lara requests that this Court grant review of his case on a grant-and-hold basis. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2).)

## QUESTION PRESENTED

1. Does Proposition 47 ("the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act") apply to the offense of unlawful taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851), because it is a lesser included offense of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (d), and that offense is eligible for resentencing to a misdemeanor under Penal Code sections 490.2 and 1170.18. (See *People v. Page, supra,* 241 Cal.App.4th 714, rev. grtd. Jan. 27, 2016, S230793.)

## REASONS FOR REVIEW

The Court of Appeal's holding that Proposition 47 does not apply to unlawfully taking or driving under Vehicle Code section 10851 must be reviewed because the issue presents an important question of law requiring uniformity of decision and settlement by this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(1).)

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Appellant adopts the procedural and factual statement in the Court of Appeal's decision.

## ARGUMENT

### THE COURT OF APPEAL ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT PROPOSITION 47 DOES NOT APPLY TO UNLAWFUL TAKING OR DRIVING UNDER VEHICLE CODE SECTION 10851.

### A. Standard of Review

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. (*People ex. rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.)

### B. The Court of Appeal Erred in Holding that Proposition 47 does not apply to Unlawful Taking or Driving Under Vehicle Code section 10851.

On August 15, 2013, appellant allegedly unlawfully took and drove a 2000 Honda Civic in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851(a). (1CT:69) On November 4, 2014, the voters approved Proposition 47. There presently exists a split of authority as to whether the sentencing provisions of section 490.2 apply to a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851(a). (Compare *People v. Page* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 714, review granted January 27, 2016, S230793 [No] with *People v. Ortiz* (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 854, review granted March 16, 2016, S232344 [Yes].) This issue is before this court in *People v. Page, supra.*

Appellant contends that a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851(a) now must be treated as a misdemeanor for purposes of sentencing unless a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the vehicle in question exceeded $950.00 or that the

defendant's criminal history permitted his treatment as a felon for purposes of sentencing. Because the jury never made such findings, the felony judgment is based upon insufficient evidence. Thus, the trial court should have treated appellant's 10851(a) conviction as a misdemeanor when it imposed judgment.

On November 4, 2014, the California Electorate passed a sentencing reform initiative commonly known as Proposition 47. It went into effect the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a) ["[a]n initiative statute or referendum approved by a majority of votes thereon takes effect the day after the election unless the measure provides otherwise"].) The reform expanded the Penal Code to include section 490.2, subdivision (a), which states that "[n]otwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor, except that such person may instead be punished pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if that person has one or more prior convictions for an offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290."

Vehicle Code section 10851(a) "defines the crime of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. Unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession is a form of theft, and the taking may be accomplished by driving the vehicle

away. For this reason, a defendant convicted under [Vehicle Code] section 10851(a) of unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession has suffered a theft conviction....." (*People v. Garza* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 871.) Thus, if a defendant with a qualifying criminal history takes a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of that vehicle, and if the value of that vehicle does not exceed $950.00, the offense falls within the parameters of Penal Code section 490.2 and must be treated as a misdemeanor for sentencing purposes.

The Court of Appeal's holding to the contrary leads to a bewildering incongruity. At present, a violation of section 487, subdivision (d)(1), commonly referred to as grand theft auto, falls within the parameters of section 490.2 where the value of the vehicle taken does not exceed $950.00, given that it constitutes a "provision of law defining grand theft . . . ." Vehicle Code section 10851(a), is a lesser included offense of grand theft auto. (*People v. Buss* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 781, 784; *People v. Pater* (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 921, 925.) If the greater offense of grand theft auto can be punished as a misdemeanor, it would be nonsensical to permit a violation of the lesser included offense under Vehicle Code section 10851(a), to be punished as a felony if it otherwise meets the criteria for leniency under the statute. "Interpretations of a statute which would lead to absurd results are to be avoided." (*People v. Villalobos* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 310, 321.)

Moreover, Proposition 47, the initiative that gave birth to section 490.2, actually refers to Vehicle Code section 10851 as a

species of theft. Indeed, Proposition 47 amended section 666, and subdivision (a) of that statute specifically refers to "auto theft under Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code . . . ." (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014), p. 72; Prop. 47, § 10.) Logic would suggest that if the drafters of Proposition 47 considered a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 as a category of theft in one statute that is part of a sentencing reform scheme, then the same meaning would extend to other statutes in that same scheme. (See *People v. Hitchings* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 915, 922.) Indeed, "[o]ne of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that interrelated statutory provisions should be harmonized and that, to that end, the same word or phrase should be given the same meaning within the interrelated provisions of the law." *(People v. Elliott* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1641 fn. 7.) Thus, the words "obtaining any property by theft" in section 490.2, subdivision (a), should be construed to include an act of "auto theft under Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code."

In short, the addition of section 490.2 to the Penal Code now means that a defendant with a qualifying criminal history may only receive a felony sentence for a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851(a), if the prosecutor has also proved that the value of the property taken exceeds $950.00.

As stated above, Vehicle Code section 10851(a), proscribes driving or taking a vehicle not the defendant's own under two different circumstances: where the defendant intends to permanently deprive the vehicle's owner of possession of it, and

where the defendant intends to only temporarily deprive the owner of possession. These two circumstances are colloquially referred to as, respectively, "auto theft" and "joy-riding." This court has confirmed that the "auto theft" circumstance is, in fact, a species of theft: if a conviction of Vehicle Code section 10851(a) "is for the taking of the vehicle, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession, then it is a theft conviction." (*People v. Garza, supra*, 36 Cal.4th 866, 881, original emphasis; see also *People v. Black* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 523, 525 [jury erred by convicting of both Vehicle Code section 10851 and receiving stolen property if 10851 conviction "based on a finding that he stole the truck"]; *People v. Strong* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 376 [same].) Given that, and the broadly inclusive language of Proposition 47, it would make little sense to hold that the less culpable conduct of joy-riding does not qualify for reduction to a misdemeanor. As stated, *ante*, we must interpret the statute to avoid such absurd results. (*People v. Villalobos, supra*, 145 Cal.App.4th 310, 321.)

Moreover, any "driving" of a vehicle necessarily includes "taking." Taking has two aspects: (1) achieving possession of the property, and (2) carrying it away. (*People v. Gomez* (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 249, 255.) One who drives a stolen car necessarily achieves possession and "carries it away" when he drives it away. *Garza, supra*, discusses taking and driving in the context of assessing whether dual convictions of Vehicle Code section 10851 and receiving stolen property are appropriate. It did not address

whether the less culpable offense of joyriding is or is not within the ambit of Proposition 47. Cases are not authority for propositions not considered. (*McDowell & Craig v. Santa Fe Springs* (1960) 54 Cal.2d 33, 38.)

This case is an example of how intertwined the meanings of taking and driving are under Vehicle Code section 10851(a). The information alleges that appellant took and drove the Honda Civic "with intent to deprive the owner of title to and possession of said vehicle." (1CT:69) The abstract of judgment states "vehicle theft conviction." (CT:308). Mr. Lara was convicted of "driving" the Honda and the jury was instructed that to find Mr. Lara guilty on Count 1, it had to find that he was driving the vehicle. (CT:193, 181) The jury was also instructed that it could find him guilty if it found he drove the vehicle without the owner's consent for "any" period of time. (1CT:181) "Any" period of time necessarily includes "permanently" depriving the owner of possession. (Garner, *A Dictionary of Modern American Usage*, 1998, p. 45 ["In a sentence implying that a selection . . . will follow, it may mean 'one or more . . .; whichever; whatever."]) The two circumstances are so similar under Vehicle Code section 10851(a) that Proposition 47 encompasses them both as theft offenses.

The Findings and Declarations section of Proposition 47 demonstrates that qualifying defendants convicted of taking *or* driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851(a) are entitled to relief. A stated goal of the measure was to ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses, to

maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime, and to invest the savings generated from this act into prevention and support programs in K-12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment. (Prop. 47, § 2; see Exhibit A, p. 70, col. 2.) Also, the "Purpose and Intent" section of the measure states that one purpose was to ""[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes." (Prop. 47, § 3; see Exhibit A, p. 70, col. 2.) Vehicle Code section 10851(a) defines nonserious, nonviolent crimes. (Compare §§ 667.5, subd. (c) and 1192.7, subd. (c).) Nothing in Proposition 47 ballot materials presented to the electorate remotely suggests voters intended to differentiate between thieves and post-theft drivers. Affording relief to defendants convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 10851(a), whether by driving or taking, is fully consistent with the stated objectives of Proposition 47.

Moreover, the measure, by its own terms, requires a liberal construction. The final sentence of the measure reads "This act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes." (Prop. 47, § 18; see Exhibit A, p. 74, col. 2). Appellant submits that the statutory language, particularly the "obtaining any property by theft" passage of section 490.2, clearly and unambiguously mandates that taking or driving a vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code section 10851(a) be included in Proposition 47. To the extent that the Court of Appeal may have perceived any ambiguity in this language, it was required to interpret the statute liberally in a manner which effectuates the

purposes of reducing prison spending on non-violent crimes, and thereby freeing up funds for school and treatment programs. Under such a liberal interpretation, violations of the statute at issue here must be afforded Proposition 47 relief.

## CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court of appeal's decision warrants review by this court. Therefore, appellant respectfully requests this court to grant review on a grant-and-hold basis. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2).)

DATED: August 21, 2017

JULIE SULLWOLD
Attorney for appellant,
Henry Arsenio Lara II

## CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING BRIEF CONTAINS 2,685 WORDS AS COUNTED BY THE PROGRAM IN COREL WORDPERFECT, VERSION X4.

JULIE SULLWOLD

# EXHIBIT A

See Concurring Opinion

**NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS**



**IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

**FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT**

**DIVISION TWO**

| | |
|---|---|
| THE PEOPLE,<br>Plaintiff and Respondent,<br>v.<br>HENRY ARSENIO LARA II<br>Defendant and Appellant. | E065029<br>(Super.Ct.No. INF1302723)<br>OPINION |

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Julie Sullwold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Peter Quon, Jr., Anthony DaSilva, and Stacy Tyler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant Henry Arsenio Lara II was found guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), a wobbler, and sentenced to prison.

He now contends that:

1. Proposition 47 applies to unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, so that this crime is a misdemeanor unless the value of the vehicle is $950 or more; in addition:

a. There was insufficient evidence that the vehicle involved was worth $950 or more.

b. The trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury to determine whether the vehicle involved was worth $950 or more.

2. Even assuming that Proposition 47 does not apply to unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle of its own force, it must be deemed to apply to avoid an equal protection violation.

3. Proposition 47 applies in this case, even though defendant's crime was committed before it went into effect.

We will hold that Proposition 47, as properly construed, does not apply to unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, nor does equal protection require that it so apply. It is therefore unnecessary for us to discuss defendant's other contentions.

## I

## FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2013, the police stopped defendant while he was driving a Honda Civic that had been stolen about a week earlier. He was in possession of two non-Honda keys; the ignition had been tampered with so as to permit these keys to be used to start it.

In 2015, in a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated proceeding, after defendant waived a jury trial, the trial court found true one prior vehicle theft-related felony conviction allegation, (Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a)), one strike prior (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and four prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to a total of ten years in prison, along with the usual fines, fees, and miscellaneous sentencing orders.

I

PROPOSITION 47 DOES NOT APPLY TO UNLAWFUL TAKING OR DRIVING

Defendant contends that Proposition 47 applies to unlawful taking or driving a vehicle.[1]

Proposition 47, also known as the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, went into effect on November 5, 2014. (*People v. Sweeney* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 295, 298.) In general, Proposition 47 reduced certain theft-related and drug-related offenses from felonies (or wobblers) to misdemeanors, provided (1) the perpetrator does not have a disqualifying prior conviction, and (2) in the case of theft-related offenses, the value of the property involved is not more than $950. (Couzens & Bigelow, Proposition 47: "The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act" (May 2017 rev. ed.) pp. 24-28.[2])

---

[1] This issue is presently before the California Supreme Court in *People v. Page* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 714, review granted January 27, 2016, S230793.

[2] Available at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop-47-Information.pdf>, as of July 18, 2017.

More specifically, as relevant here, Proposition 47 enacted Penal Code section 490.2, subdivision (a), which provides: "Notwithstanding . . . any . . . provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the . . . property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor . . . ."

Defendant was convicted of unlawful taking or driving in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), which, as relevant here, provides: "Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, . . . is guilty of a public offense . . . ." This is a wobbler, punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor in the court's discretion. (*Ibid.*; see Pen. Code, § 17, subds. (a), (b).)

Defendant contends that Proposition 47 applies to him because, although it went into effect after his crime, it was already in effect when he was tried and sentenced.[3] The People dispute this contention on the merits and further respond that defendant forfeited it by failing to raise it below. We need not decide these issues. We may assume, without deciding, that Proposition 47 could apply to defendant, even though it went into effect after his crime.

---

[3] This issue is presently before the California Supreme Court in *People v. DeHoyos* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 363, review granted September 30, 2015, S228230.

Unlawful taking or driving, however, does not constitute "obtaining . . . property by theft" within the meaning of Penal Code section 490.2, subdivision (a). Theft by larceny requires a felonious taking and carrying away. (*People v. Gomez* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 254-255.)[4] By contrast, unlawful taking or driving can be committed merely by driving, without any taking. (*People v. Frye* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1086.) Similarly, theft requires the intent to permanently deprive (*People v. Riel* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1205) — also known as the intent to steal. Unlawful taking or driving, however, by its terms, does not require the intent to steal; it can be committed with the intent to temporarily deprive.

Accordingly, as the Supreme Court has stated: "The offense of unlawfully taking a vehicle, defined in Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), is sometimes called 'vehicle theft.' [However, b]ecause the crime requires only the driving of a vehicle (not necessarily a taking) and an intent only to temporarily deprive the owner of the vehicle, it is technically not a 'theft.' [Citations.]" (*People v. Montoya* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034, fn. 2.)

We also note that Penal Code section 490.2, subdivision (a) applies "[n]otwithstanding . . . any . . . provision of law defining grand theft . . . ." Thus, it does

---

[4] For the sake of completeness, we note that theft can also be committed by false pretenses and by embezzlement. (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a); see generally *People v. Gonzales* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 864-866.) Suffice it to say that each of these has elements that unlawful taking or driving does not require.

not override statutes defining crimes other than grand theft. That would include Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a).

Defendant claims that Proposition 47 itself states that unlawful taking or driving is a form of theft. Not so. His argument is based on Penal Code section 666, subdivision (a), which provides enhanced penalties for persons convicted of petty theft who have a theft-related prior; one of the specified priors is — and has been since 1987 (Stats. 1986, ch. 402, § 1, p. 1622) — "auto theft under Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code . . . ." Proposition 47 amended Penal Code section 666, but it did not change this language. (Prop. 47, § 10.) Defendant sees this as adopting it. However, there was no need to change it, as *Montoya* had already held that it is merely a loose description, not a technical definition. In any event, Proposition 47 merely left it on the books; it did not adopt it.

Finally, defendant argues that our interpretation leads to absurd results. As he points out, Penal Code section 487, subdivision (d)(1) provides that the theft of an automobile constitutes grand theft (grand theft auto). Penal Code section 490.2, subdivision (a) therefore applies to reduce grand theft auto to a misdemeanor when the value of the automobile is not more than $950. However, it has been said that unlawful taking or driving is a lesser included offense of grand theft auto. (*People v. Barrick* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 128 [dictum]; *People v. Buss* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 781, 784 [dictum]; *People v. Pater* (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 921, 925.) Thus, when a vehicle worth

not more than $950 is involved, the greater offense would be a misdemeanor, but the lesser included offense would be a wobbler.

Meanwhile, defendant also contends that he is similarly situated to persons convicted of grand theft auto, and that Proposition 47 must be deemed to apply to unlawful taking or driving a vehicle in order to avoid an equal protection violation. In our view, his absurdity argument and his equal protection argument are one and the same. We recognize the "' . . . fundamental principle of statutory construction . . . that the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (*People v. Cook* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 927.) However, the supposed absurdity on which defendant relies is that two groups that are supposedly similarly situated are being treated differently. Under standard equal protection principles, as discussed in more detail in part III, *post*, if there is a rational basis for this disparate treatment, then there is no equal protection violation. Also, in that event, we can hardly say that the disparate treatment is absurd. Accordingly, we will discuss the argument under this rubric.

For the present, we conclude that Proposition 47 does not apply to unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle.

## III

## EQUAL PROTECTION DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT PROPOSITION 47 APPLY TO UNLAWFUL TAKING OR DRIVING

Defendant forfeited his equal protection claim by failing to raise it below. (*People v. Alexander* (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14.) However, we discuss it in any event because it is relevant to his statutory interpretation argument (see part II, *ante*), and also as an alternative reason for rejecting it.

"The level of judicial scrutiny brought to bear on the challenged treatment depends on the nature of the distinguishing classification. [Citation.] Unless the distinction 'touch[es] upon fundamental interests' or is based on gender, it will survive an equal protection challenge 'if the challenged classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.' [Citations.]" (*People v. Descano* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 175, 181-182.) "A criminal defendant has no vested interest '"in a specific term of imprisonment or in the designation a particular crime receives."' [Citation.]" (*People v. Turnage* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.) "Therefore, the rational basis test is applicable to an equal protection challenge involving '"an alleged sentencing disparity."' [Citation.]" (*People v. Martinez* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 234, 244.)

Here, "the electorate could rationally extend misdemeanor punishment to some . . . offenses but not to others, as a means of testing whether Proposition 47 has a positive or negative impact on the criminal justice system. 'Nothing compels the state "to choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all."

[Citation.] Far from having to "solve all related ills at once" [citation], the Legislature has "broad discretion" to proceed in an incremental and uneven manner without necessarily engaging in arbitrary and unlawful discrimination. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (*People v. Acosta* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 521, 527-528.)

Assuming any more particularized justification is needed, the electorate could have intended to provide for prosecutorial discretion. Sometimes, depending on the circumstances, unlawful taking or driving may be more culpable than grand theft auto — e.g., when driving the vehicle after its original taking delays or prevents its recovery, or when the victim is particularly vulnerable. The electorate could have rationally concluded that carving out unlawful taking or driving from the scope of Proposition 47 allows for prosecutorial discretion in charging certain vehicle takings as felonies based on the defendant's overall culpability. (See *People v. Wilkinson* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838-839.)

In any event, "neither the existence of two identical criminal statutes prescribing different levels of punishments, nor the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion in charging under one such statute and not the other, violates equal protection principles. [Citation.]" (*People v. Wilkinson, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at p. 838.) The Supreme Court has stated: "[A] car thief may not complain because he may have been subjected to imprisonment for more than 10 years for grand theft of an automobile [citations] when, under the same facts, he might have been subjected to no more than 5 years under the provisions of section 10851 of the Vehicle Code." (*People v. Romo* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 197.) Here,

more than 40 years after *Romo*, the situation is reversed — the penalty under Vehicle Code section 10851 is higher than for theft of a vehicle — but the principle is the same.

Accordingly, the fact that Proposition 47 applies to grand theft auto but not to unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle does not violate equal protection.

## IV

## DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ
P. J.

I concur:

McKINSTER
J.

[*People v. Lara*, E065029]

Slough, J., Concurring.

I agree with the majority's conclusion Lara's felony Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction must stand, but I write separately because I reach that conclusion by a different route. The majority affirms Lara's conviction on the ground Proposition 47 does not apply to Vehicle Code section 10851 full stop. It is my view Proposition 47 applies to Vehicle Code section 10851 when the offense is *theft*, but does not affect the prosecution's charging discretion or burden of proof when the offense is *unlawful driving*. Because the record establishes the district attorney prosecuted the case as an unlawful driving offense, I concur in affirming the judgment.

As the majority notes, the issue of whether Proposition 47 affects the prosecution's discretion to charge low-value vehicle thefts as felonies under Vehicle Code section 10851 is currently before the California Supreme Court. In *People v. Van Orden* (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1277, review granted June 14, 2017 (S241574) (*Van Orden*), a majority of a different panel of this court held Proposition 47 eliminates prosecutorial discretion to charge as a felony *any theft* of a vehicle worth less than $950—even when the offense is charged under Vehicle Code section 10851. (*Van Orden*, at p. 1283.) Our holding is based on the California Supreme Court's decision in *People v. Garza* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866 (*Garza*), where the court explained some Vehicle Code section 10851 violations are for unlawful driving—based on an intent to deprive the owner of

possession only temporarily, whereas others are thefts—based on an intent to deprive the owner of possession permanently. (*Garza*, at p. 871.)

This theft/driving distinction is important in the context of Proposition 47 because Penal Code section 490.2 changed the punishment for theft. "[O]btaining any property by theft where the value of the . . . property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) *shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor.*" (Pen. Code, § 490.2, subd. (a), italics added.) By its plain terms, Penal Code section 490.2 altered the way prosecutors may charge vehicle thefts by mandating that any theft of *any property* worth less than $950 be punished as petty theft. (*Van Orden, supra*, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1287-1288.) In other words, regardless of whether the prosecution charges a defendant under Penal Code section 487 (grand theft auto) or Vehicle Code section 10851, it must prove the stolen vehicle was worth at least $950, otherwise the offense is petty theft.

The majority argues Penal Code section 490.2 has no application to Vehicle Code section 10851 because violations of that provision are not technically thefts. As support, the majority cites *People v. Montoya* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031 (*Montoya*), where the California Supreme Court disapproved the common practice of calling Vehicle Code section 10851 "vehicle theft" because the intent to steal is not a necessary element of the offense. (Maj. opn *ante*, p. 5, citing *Montoya* at p. 1034, fn. 2.) It is true "vehicle theft" is not a good shorthand for Vehicle Code section 10851. The provision proscribes a "wide range" of conduct—driving and theft. (*People v. Jaramillo* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752,

757; *Garza, supra*, 35 Cal.4th at p. 876.) To describe it as a theft statute would certainly be a misnomer.

What *Montoya* does not say, however, is that a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 can *never* constitute a theft. Indeed, as the California Supreme Court explained less than a year later, just the opposite is true. "[A] defendant convicted under section 10851(a) of unlawfully *taking* a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession *has suffered a theft conviction.*" (*Garza, supra*, 35 Cal.4th at p. 871, second italics added.) Thus, when the Vehicle Code section 10851 offense is based on theft, Penal Code section 490.2 applies and requires the prosecution prove the vehicle was worth $950 or more in order to secure a felony conviction. When the offense is based on driving without the owner's permission, Penal Code section 490.2 does not apply. *Van Orden* responds to the majority's other arguments regarding Penal Code section 490.2 and Vehicle Code section 10851 at some length, so I will not belabor those points here. (*Van Orden, supra*, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1289-1295.)

Turning to Lara's claim on appeal, he asserts the prosecution was required to prove the vehicle he was driving was worth at least $950 in order to secure a felony Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction. He argues that because the prosecution presented no value evidence at trial, his conviction must be reduced to petty theft. Lara's argument fails because the prosecution charged him with unlawful driving—not theft—and proved the elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of the victim and police established Lara was arrested for driving the victim's car, several days

after she had reported it stolen. The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of unlawful driving,[5] and the jury convicted Lara of "driving a vehicle without permission." I would therefore reject Lara's claim the prosecution was required to present evidence of value and affirm the judgment on the ground Proposition 47 does not apply to unlawful driving offenses like the one here.

SLOUGH
J.

[5] The instruction on unlawful driving read: "The defendant is charged in Count 1 with unlawfully driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: (1) [t]he defendant drove someone else's vehicle without the owner's consent; AND (2) [w]hen the defendant did so, he intended to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time."

**DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL**

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA

I, JULIE SULLWOLD, am employed in the County of Santa Barbara, State of California. I am over the age of 18, an active member of the State Bar, and not a party to the within action. My business address is 315 Meigs Rd., Ste. A-187, Santa Barbara, CA 93109.

On **August 25, 2017**, I electronically submitted the **PETITION FOR REVIEW** to the Supreme Court of California via the court's website. For those marked "E-Service," I transmitted a PDF version of the above document by TrueFiling electronic service by e-mail to the service address(es) provided below. For those marked "Mail Service," I deposited in the United States mail, in Santa Barbara, California, a copy of the above document in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed as provided below.

**E-service:** APPELLATE DEFENDERS, INC., 555 W. BEECH ST., #300, SAN DIEGO, CA 92101-2939 @ eservice-court@adi-sandiego.com

KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 110 WEST "A" STREET, SUITE 1100, P. O. BOX 85266, SAN DIEGO, CA 92186-5266 @ ADIEService@doj.ca.gov

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO, 3389 TWELFTH STREET, RIVERSIDE, CA 92501 - filed via the Court of Appeals' TrueFiling system

APPEALS AND APPELLATE DIVISION, SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE, 8303 N HAVEN AVE, 1ST FLOOR, RANCHO CUCAMONGA, CA 91730 ATTN: HON RAYMOND L HAIGHT @ Appellate-unit@rivcoda.org

**Mail service:** APPELLANT

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct. Executed on **August 25, 2017**, at Santa Barbara, CA.



JULIE SULLWOLD