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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SUPREME COURT
FILED

THE PEOPLE,)
)
 Plaintiff and Respondent,)
)
 v.)
)
 ALLEN DIMEN DELEON,)
)
 Defendant and Appellant.)
 _____)

No. DEC 01 2015
 Frank A. McGuire Clerk
 A140050 _____
 Deputy
 (Solano County
 Super. Ct. No. FCR302185)

Appeal from a Judgment of the Superior Court of
the County of Solano, State of California

Honorable Robert Bowers, Judge

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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 By Appointment of the
 Court of Appeal
 Under the First District
 Appellate Project
 Independent Case System

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)	No. FCR302185
Defendant and Appellant.)	
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PETITION FOR REVIEW

TO THE HONORABLE TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIEF JUSTICE, AND TO
THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA:

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.500, petitioner ALLEN DIMEN DELEON respectfully petitions this Court to grant review following the published decision of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, filed in that court on October 28, 2015. A copy of the opinion of the Court of Appeal is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Rehearing was denied on November 20, 2015. A copy of the denial of the petition for rehearing is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Does due process require a timely evidentiary preliminary probable cause hearing following revocation of parole?

NECESSITY FOR REVIEW

In 2011, California began enacting legislation that significantly altered the state's criminal justice system. (*Valdivia v. Brown* (E.D. Cal. 2013) 956 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1126.) This legislation established, inter alia, a uniform process for revocation of probation, parole, and postrelease supervision of felons. (Sen. Bill No. 1023 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) § 2(a).) The Legislature intended this uniform procedure to comply with the due process requirements of *Morrissey v. Brewer* (1972) 408 U.S. 472. (Sen. Bill No. 1023 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) § 2(b).) Under this uniform procedure, the courts have jurisdiction over petitions for revocation of supervision, including parole. (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subds. (a), (b).) The uniform process became effective as to parolees on July 1, 2013. (Pen. Code, § 3000.08, subd. (m).)

The Court of Appeal's opinion in the present case has sent shock waves throughout California. Following a period of chaos and uncertainty after Realignment, there was finally some resolution with the decision by the Fourth District, Division Three, in *Williams v. Superior Court* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636. Now the parole revocation process is descending into chaos once more, with two conflicting published decisions on how to handle the probable cause determination.

As explained in the following Argument section, the decision in this case is at odds with *Williams v. Superior Court, supra*, and with established legal principles. The First District is clearly in error, since in *Morrissey v. Brewer, supra*, 408 U.S. 472, the United States Supreme Court held that a parolee is entitled to certain procedural due process protections before parole may be revoked. (*Id.* at 482-484.) Among these is the right to a prompt evidentiary hearing on whether probable cause exists to believe the parolee violated a condition of parole. (*Id.* at 484, 487.)

The First District Court of Appeal has held that a *Morrissey*-compliant probable cause hearing within 15 days of arrest is not required in California. The First District's published opinion in the present case directly conflicts with the published opinion in *Williams v. Superior Court, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th 636, which holds that, in parole revocation proceedings, a parolee is entitled to arraignment within 10 days of an arrest for a parole violation, a probable cause hearing with 15 days of the arrest, and a final hearing within 45 days of the arrest. This conflict is bound to lead to confusion among the districts and trial courts.

The First District is out of step with the parole landscape following Realignment. The legislative goal is to get people back into the community. The probable cause hearing is essential to show the court what the issues are, view the strengths and weaknesses of the case, and facilitate settlement. It is essential to getting the petition dismissed if there is no probable cause. A determination of probable cause without the engines of evidence and cross-examination is not sufficient. Time frames are important, as assessments are being

made as to whether violation is appropriate and interim sanctions are preferable. A parolee should not have to sit in jail until a final revocation hearing.

Petitioner contends that not requiring a *Morrissey*-compliant probable cause determination within 15 days denies him and other parolees the procedural protections to which he is entitled in revocation proceedings. He requests he be provided with the reasonable due process of a *Morrissey*-compliant probable cause hearing within 15 days of arrest. This standard would also comply with the mandate of Penal Code section 3044.

Review is necessary pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.512, because the opinion below is in conflict with an opinion of another district, and because important questions of law are presented which are of statewide importance. It is respectfully suggested that this Court should also grant review and resolve this issue before other cases generate further confusion; uniformity is particularly important in this area of law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 30, 2013, the Fairfield Parole Unit filed a Petition for Revocation of petitioner's parole. On September 6, 2013, the Solano County Superior Court found probable cause to support a revocation, and preliminarily revoked supervision. (CT 1.) On September 11, 2013, when petitioner was brought to court for the first time, he requested a dismissal on grounds that his statutory due process rights had been violated. (CT 2-7; RT [9-11-13] 4.) On September 25, 2013, following a hearing, the court denied the motion to dismiss. (CT 16; RT [9-25-13] 9.) On October 3, 2013, following a contested hearing, the court found petitioner in violation of parole, and sentenced him to 180 days in jail. (CT 19-20; RT [10-3-13] 35-37.)

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on October 8, 2013. (CT 21.) On appeal, he contended that his revocation must be reversed and vacated due to the superior court's failure to timely conduct a preliminary probable cause hearing. The Court of Appeal concluded that, under the parole revocation scheme embodied in Penal Code sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 as amended by the 2011 Realignment Act, superior courts are not required to conduct preliminary probable cause hearings as specified in *Morrissey v. Brewer, supra*, 408 U.S. 471, before revoking parole, and that a timely single hearing procedure can suffice. The Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that petitioner was afforded constitutionally adequate process, and affirmed the order finding him in violation of parole and sentencing him to 180 days in custody. On November 6, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeal, which was denied on November 20, 2015.

STATEMENT OF FACTS¹

On August 23, 2013, officers and agents of the SAFE Task Force, a sex offender task force run by the Sheriff's Office in conjunction with U.S. Marshals, Probation, and Parole, conducted a parole search of petitioner's motel room in Vallejo. (RT [10-3-13] 26-28.) Two cell phones belonging to petitioner were located. (RT [10-3-13] 28.) One of the phones contained the following: A video of a male masturbating in that motel room (RT [10-3-13] 29); and photographs of teenagers or young adults showing their genitals in sexually explicit positions (RT [10-3-13] 29, 35); adult women showing their breasts and vaginal areas (RT [10-3-13] 30); girls under 18 showing their breasts and vaginal areas (RT [10-3-13] 30-31); pre-pubescents in underwear (RT [10-3-13] 31, 36); and adults in various positions of fornication and/or nakedness (RT [10-3-13] 35.) The photographs were admitted into evidence. (RT [10-3-13] 32-33; People's Exhibits 1-8.)

The court found petitioner to be in violation of parole conditions that prohibited him from possessing pornography and possessing material depicting children in undergarments. (SCT 1, 6, 24; RT [10-3-13] 35-36.)

¹ The factual summary is taken from the hearing on the parole violation held on October 3, 2013.

ARGUMENT

THE SUPERIOR COURT'S FAILURE TO HOLD A TIMELY PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S PAROLE VIOLATION

In its published opinion issued on October 28, 2015, the Court of Appeal held that superior courts are not required to conduct preliminary probable cause hearings as specified in *Morrissey v. Brewer, supra*, 408 U.S. 471, before revoking parole, that a timely single hearing procedure can suffice, and that any delay in promptly bringing petitioner before a judge was harmless. Petitioner maintains that the due process clauses require further procedural protection than the Court of Appeal's holding provides. (Amends. V, XIV; *Morrissey v. Brewer, supra*, 408 U.S. 471; *Gagnon v. Scarpelli* (1973) 411 U.S. 778; *Williams v. Superior Court, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th 636.) Petitioner requests a *Morrissey*-compliant probable cause hearing within 15 days of arrest.

Petitioner's request must be analyzed under the requisites of the federal Constitution. As acknowledged by the Court of Appeal below, the balancing test for procedural due process claims is to be found in *Mathews v. Eldridge* (1976) 424 U.S. 319. That test requires a court to consider three factors. However, petitioner analyzes those factors quite differently than does the Court of Appeal. Petitioner requests this Court to adopt his analysis, modelled on the analysis in *Williams v. Superior Court, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th 636, and set forth below.

The first aspect of the First District's decision is the application the three-factor test of *Mathews v. Eldredge, supra*, 424 U.S. 319 to determine the measure of due process

required to prevent arbitrary and oppressive official action. Certain considerations were omitted, and the balancing process was uneven.

As to factor one, the private interest affected by the official action, the Court of Appeal discussed the parolee's interest in conditional liberty. (Opn. 6.) The court ignored a fundamental part of this factor. To quote *Morrissey v. Brewer, supra*, 408 U.S. 471, "The parolee is not the only one who has a stake in his conditional liberty. Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring a parolee to normal and useful life within the law. Society thus has an interest in not having parole revoked because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke parole, given the breach of parole conditions. See *People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden*, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 379, and n. 2, 267 N.E.2d 238, 2389, and n. 2 (1971) (parole board has less than full picture of facts). And society has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness." (*Morrissey v. Brewer, supra*, at 484.)

The second factor in the *Mathews* test is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of conditional liberty under the procedures employed, and the likely value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. The third factor, the government's interest, includes the function involved, and the fiscal or administrative burdens that additional procedures may impose. (Opn. at 7-9.) The second factor requires greater emphasis. Consideration of the likely value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards is extremely important in assessing parole revocation hearings. Financial cost alone should not control in

determining whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard. (*Mathews v. Eldredge, supra*, 424 U.S. at 348.) While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process. (*Goldberg v. Kelly* (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 261.) In sum, the possibility of additional expense does not justify the use of procedures that fall below optimal constitutional standards.

Further, the First District's opinion omitted some considerations from the third factor. Offsetting the type of challenges faced by the courts as expressed in the opinion is the state's interest in the enforcement of rules providing for evidence-based sanctions to avoid unnecessary, counterproductive incarcerations before the damage is done, e.g., loss of the parolee's housing, social support ties, and community stability. (See *Williams v. Superior Court, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th at 660.) If the parole violation is also charged as a new felony, a preliminary hearing must in any event be set within 10 court days of a defendant's arraignment unless waived. (See Pen. Code, § 859b.) Under these circumstances, it could be anticipated the preliminary hearing would also address the probable cause issue on the parole violation, resulting in no additional court time. If the parole violation does not result in additional criminal charges, the probable cause hearing would not consume much time. The additional burdens imposed upon the court do not outweigh the benefits to both the government and the parolee in avoiding further incarceration where the alleged violation is shown to lack probable cause. As to the burdens placed on Parole, a 15-day time limit for a probable cause hearing may require

them to make faster decisions on whether to seek revocation. This burden should not be insurmountable, especially if Parole and the court collaborate to establish a workable system. (See *Williams v. Superior Court, supra*, at 660.) Finally, the removal of the safeguard of an evidentiary probable cause hearing may well cause more mistakes. Surely it would cost money to incarcerate people who shouldn't be incarcerated.

The Court of Appeal for the First District is trying to remove constitutional rights because of practical concerns which are ephemeral, subject to changes in the economy, the budget, court administration, and staffing decisions. (Opn. at 9-10.) These concerns, though pressing at the moment, should not triumph over longstanding, fundamental ideals.

This standard would also comply with the mandate of Penal Code section 3044. The Court of Appeal's opinion states, "DeLeon's argument that a probable cause hearing within 15 days of his arrest was required by section 3044 is unpersuasive. Section 3044 is directed to the 'Board of Parole Hearings or its successor in interest,' and provides the procedural protections the agency must afford parolees facing revocation,' including a probable cause hearing no later than 15 days following his or her arrest for violation of parole.' (§ 3044, subd. (a)(1).) But the superior court is not a successor in interest to the Board of Parole Hearings, an agency in the executive branch of government. Section 3044 does not apply to parole revocation proceedings conducted by the superior court." (Opn. at 10.) The opinion continues, "Unlike the Fourth District in *Williams, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th 636, we decline to require two parole revocation hearings, or set strict time limits in parole revocation proceedings." (Opn. at 11.)

In distinguishing *Williams v. Superior Court, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th 636, the First District did not consider the portion of *Williams* explained below, and thus misinterpreted *Williams'* underlying authority. Set forth below is a paraphrasing of *Williams'* reasoning, with application to the facts of the present case. (See *Williams v. Superior Court, supra*, at 656-659.)

Penal Code section 1203.2 governs the procedure for revocation of parole supervision. *People v. Woodall* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1221 construed section 1203.2 “to impliedly require a probable cause hearing if there is any significant delay between the probationer's arrest and a final revocation hearing.” (*Id.* at 1238.) Thus, probable cause hearings which are compliant with *Morrissey v. Brewer, supra*, 408 U.S. 471, are required in post-realignment California, although a prompt unitary hearing may suffice. But the evidentiary hearing in appellant's case was not prompt. Further, although section 1203.2 makes no mention of a supervised person's right to a probable cause hearing and to present evidence, the Legislature intended to comply with *Morrissey* and *People v. Vickers* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 when it created a uniform process of revocation of supervision under post-realignment section 1203.2. Finally, *Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra*, 411 U.S. 778, holds that two separate hearings are required. (*Id.* at 781-782.)

At first glance, section 3044 may seem inconsistent with the Legislature's intent to have all supervision revocation proceedings governed by section 1203.2. Commentators have noted it is unlikely that section 3044 applies to the courts. Yet section 3044 is still on the books. Section 3044, subdivision (a) provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, the

Board of Parole Hearings or its successor in interest shall be the state's parole authority and shall be responsible for protecting victims' rights in the parole process." Section 3044, subdivision (b), provides: "The board shall report to the Governor." The courts are not the state's parole authority after July 1, 2013. It is doubtful the courts, in the judicial branch of government, can be a successor in interest to the Board of Parole Hearings, which is in the executive branch. And the courts do not report to the Governor.

Although section 3044 might appear to be superseded by the realignment statutes, the implied repeal of a statute is disfavored. (*Crosby v. Patch* (1861) 18 Cal. 438, 441.) "A new statute is not construed as an 'implied repeal' unless it is clear that the later enactment is intended to supersede the existing law." (*California Oak Foundation v. County of Tehama* (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1217, 112.) Rather, the two must be construed together, and effect given, if possible, to both. (*Crosby, supra*, at 441.) Further, section 3044 was enacted as a voter initiative, which, by its terms may "not be amended by the Legislature except by a statute passed in each house by roll-call vote entered in the journal, three-fourths of the membership of each house concurring, or by a statute that becomes effective only when approved by the voters." (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) text of Prop. 9, § 9, at 132.) Section 1203.2 was passed in its current form as Senate Bill No. 76 in the California Senate by a vote of 30 senators (three-fourths of the senate membership of 40), and by the California Assembly by a vote of 54 to 25 (a margin less than three-fourths of the assembly membership). These margins thus were less than the 75 percent concurrence in both houses as required by the terms of Proposition 9 for an

implied amendment or repeal of section 3044. (See also Cal. Const., art. II, § 10 subd. (c), [forbidding the Legislature from amending enactments made by voter initiative if the amendments are inconsistent with that initiative].)

While it may be true that the courts are not the “successor in interest” to the Board of Parole Hearings, those portions of section 3044 intended to provide minimum standards of due process protection to parolees can be harmonized with section 1203.2. Prime among these minimum standards guaranteed by section 3044 are the entitlements to a probable cause hearing within 15 days, and a revocation hearing within 45 days of an arrest for violation of parole. Thus, section 3044 does apply to parole revocation proceedings conducted by the superior courts.

The First District's opinion concludes by setting forth the proceedings accorded petitioner below and states, “While we recognize the importance of a prompt review when the state acts to deprive a parolee of his or her conditional liberty, the proceedings here were not unduly protracted and satisfied due process.” (Opn. 10.) However, the proceedings below were not sufficient to satisfy due process. There was review by a parole supervisor for probable cause. But parole supervisors are not experts at the law. Petitioner was appointed counsel and his counsel was provided the documentation supporting the charges. The court made a probable cause determination within 15 days of appellant's arrest, and appellant was given a full evidentiary hearing within 45 days of his arrest. But under those proceedings, a parolee has to wait for a full revocation hearing while being subject to incarceration. Counsel needs to be able to show the district attorney

and the court the issues, and the strength or weakness of a case, in a timely manner, so as to catch mistakes quickly before a parolee's life and work are disrupted. An early evidentiary hearing is essential to show whether the legal elements have been met or not. There has to be a mechanism, and that is the probable cause hearing. It should further be noted that *Williams v. Superior Court, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th 636, although in a different procedural posture, does not require a specific showing of prejudice to the defendant.

In keeping with United States Supreme Court precedent, and with the spirit of the 2011 Realignment Act, a full probable cause hearing within 15 days of arrest should be required for parolees.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully requests that review be granted.

Dated: December 1, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Roberta Simon", written in a cursive style.

ROBERTA SIMON
Attorney for Petitioner
Allen Dimen DeLeon

EXHIBIT A

COPY

Filed 10/28/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
 Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.
 ALLEN DIMEN DELEON,
 Defendant and Appellant.

A140050

(Solano County
 Super. Ct. No. FCR302185)



Allen DeLeon appeals following the revocation of his parole. He contends his revocation must be reversed and vacated due to the superior court's failure to timely conduct a preliminary probable cause hearing. We conclude that under the parole revocation scheme embodied in Penal Code¹ sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 as amended by the 2011 Realignment Act, superior courts are not required to conduct preliminary probable cause hearings as specified in *Morrissey v. Brewer* (1972) 408 U.S. 471 (*Morrissey*) before revoking parole, and that a timely single hearing procedure can suffice. In light of the judicial probable cause determination made within 14 days of DeLeon's arrest, his appearance before the court on the 20th day of his detention and the other procedural protections afforded to DeLeon in this case and under the Realignment Act, the hearing conducted within 45 days of his arrest afforded him constitutionally adequate process. Moreover, because he suffered no prejudice, any delay in promptly bringing him before a judge was harmless. Thus, we affirm.

¹ Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

I.

In 2013, DeLeon was on parole following a 2003 conviction for a lewd act committed on a minor. He was released to parole on July 25, 2010. Among the conditions of parole were prohibitions against DeLeon possessing any pornographic material, material that depicted adults or children in undergarments, or devices for viewing sexually explicit programming.

On August 23, 2013, DeLeon's parole agent conducted a sex offender compliance check at DeLeon's motel room. His parole agent found DeLeon in possession of a mobile phone that contained a video of an adult male exposing his penis and masturbating, and pictures of women with their breasts and vaginas exposed and engaged in sexual acts. He was charged with a violation of parole and booked into county jail.

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation determined there was probable cause for the charges and DeLeon was given written notice of the parole violations on August 26, 2013. The petition to revoke was referred to the superior court on August 30, and a petition to revoke parole was filed in the superior court on September 4, 2013. A judicial officer reviewed the rules violation report, concluded there was probable cause to support revocation and revoked DeLeon's parole supervision on September 6, 2013. A revocation hearing was scheduled for September 11.

When DeLeon appeared with appointed counsel at the September 11 hearing,² he moved to dismiss charges on the grounds that he did not get a probable cause hearing within 15 days of his arrest as specified in Penal Code section 3044. The court set a further hearing and a briefing schedule. When the motion to dismiss was heard on September 25, the court determined that, in light of the Department of Corrections' statutory authority to subject a parolee to flash incarceration for up to 10 days, the petition to revoke referred to the court on August 30 and filed on September 4 was not unreasonably delayed. Nor was there an unreasonable delay in finding probable cause

² The record does not show precisely when counsel was appointed, but DeLeon's lawyer stated he generally receives the files in these cases two days before the initial hearing.

because a judicial officer reviewed the charges and passed upon probable cause on September 6, the fourteenth day after DeLeon's detention. The motion was denied.

The revocation charges proceeded to a hearing on the merits on October 3rd, 41 days after DeLeon was taken into custody. A parole agent testified that he went to DeLeon's room and found two cell phones. The agent confirmed with DeLeon that the phones were his, and on one of the phones the agent discovered a considerable amount of sexually explicit material that he described or provided to the court.

The court concluded that DeLeon violated his parole by possessing pornography and material that depicted children in their undergarments. He was sentenced to 180 days in custody with credit for 84 days before reinstatement to parole. His appeal of the order was timely.

II.

In *Morrissey*, the Supreme Court held that due process requires that revocation of parole by an administrative agency afford a parolee an informal preliminary hearing to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe he or she has violated parole; and an opportunity for a more formal hearing with written notice of the charges, disclosure of the evidence to be used against the parolee, an opportunity for the parolee to be heard and present evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, a neutral and detached hearing body, and a written statement of the reasons for revoking parole. (*Morrissey, supra*, 408 U.S. at pp. 485–490.)

Historically in California the power to grant and revoke parole was vested in the executive branch in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the courts. (*In re Prather* (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238, 254.) In 1994 a class of California parolees challenged this system of parole on the grounds that parole revocation processes did not comport with the due process requirements prescribed for such proceedings by the Supreme Court of the United States in *Gagnon v. Scarpelli* (1973) 411 U.S. 778 and *Morrissey*. That litigation resulted in comprehensive changes to the parole revocation process as administered by the department. (*Valdivia v. Brown* (2013) 956 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1127–1129.)

However, “[t]his system began to change on April 4, 2011, when the Governor signed Assembly Bill 109, entitled ‘The 2011 Realignment Legislation Addressing Public Safety.’” (*Valdivia v. Brown, supra*, 956 F.Supp.2d at p. 1130.) Among other changes to the parole system, AB 109 called for the state courts, not the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, to perform various functions related to parole. (*Ibid.*) Subsequent legislation narrowed the role of the state courts to conducting parole revocation proceedings. (*Ibid.*)

That system is codified in sections 1203.2 and 3000.08. The statutes vest parole authorities with the option to impose an intermediate sanction of flash incarceration of up to 10 days upon a parole violator. But if an intermediate sanction is not appropriate, parole authorities must petition the superior court to revoke parole. (section 3000.08.) Upon arrest of the parolee or issuance of a warrant in such cases, “the court may revoke and terminate the supervision of the person if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or her supervision.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (a); see § 3000.08, subd. (f).) Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 4.541 sets forth the information to be reported to the court by the supervising agency seeking revocation. The Legislature intended “to provide for a uniform supervision revocation process for petitions to revoke probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, and parole,” that complies with the due process protections prescribed in *Morrissey* and *People v. Vickers* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 (*Vickers*). (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2.) Implicitly, this requires the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to revoke parole.

In *Vickers* our Supreme Court applied the due process requirements articulated in *Morrissey* to revocation of probation. Those procedures included *Morrissey*’s preliminary probable cause hearing requirement and the more formal procedural guarantees it identified in connection with the revocation hearing. (*Vickers, supra*, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 458–459, 461–462.) Three years later, the court clarified that since “probation revocation, unlike parole revocation, is in California a judicial proceeding

with concomitant procedural benefits for a probationer at all stages of the revocation process. . . . [S]o long as ‘equivalent due process safeguards’ assure that a probationer is not arbitrarily deprived of his conditional liberty for any significant period of time [citation], a unitary hearing will usually suffice in probation revocation cases to serve the purposes of the separate preliminary and formal revocation hearings outlined in *Morrissey*.” (*People v. Coleman* (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 894–895 (*Coleman*).)

DeLeon argues that the failure of the superior court to hold a timely preliminary probable cause hearing on revocation of his parole denied him due process and required dismissal of the petition for revocation. He bases his argument primarily on *Morrissey* and *In re Marquez* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1, where the court of appeal held that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s failure to provide a parolee “a revocation hearing with due process protections within 35 days, or a revocation hearing with due process protections within a reasonable time beyond the 35 days,” warranted the parolee’s release. (*In re Marquez* at p. 16.) But since realignment, parole revocation is no longer an administrative proceeding conducted by an agency in the executive branch of government. Rather, it is a judicial proceeding before the superior court, and as recognized in *Coleman*, cases such as *Morrissey* stating the due process requirements for revocation of parole by executive branch agencies do not clearly mandate the process that must be employed by the courts. (§ 3000.08; *Coleman, supra*, 13 Cal.3d at p. 894.)

“[W]ell-settled authority establishes that every parolee retains basic constitutional protection against *arbitrary and oppressive official action*.” (*In re Taylor* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1038.) In order to determine the measure of process required to prevent such action against a parolee facing revocation, we apply the three-factor test articulated by the Supreme Court in *Mathews v. Eldridge* (1976) 424 U.S. 319 (*Mathews*). (*Williams v. Superior Court* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636 (*Williams*).)³ The first factor requires that

³ Analysis under the due process clauses of the California Constitution is similar, and in this case would not lead us to a different result. (See *People v. Ramirez* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 269.)

we identify the private interest that will be affected by the official action. (*Id.* at p. 659, citing *Mathews, supra*, 424 U.S. at p. 335.)

The private interest at stake here is a parolee's interest in conditional liberty. While they enjoy most of the basic rights of citizens to come and go when and as they wish, there are significant restrictions on parolees' liberty. (*In re Taylor, supra*, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1039.) It is a "conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions." (*Morrissey, supra*, 408 U.S. at p. 480.) Our supreme court has observed that "[t]he interest in parole supervision to ensure public safety, which justifies administrative parole revocation proceedings in lieu of criminal trial with the attendant protections accorded defendants by the Bill of Rights, also permits restrictions on parolees' liberty and privacy interests." [Citation.] 'Parole is the conditional release of a prisoner who has already served part of his or her state prison sentence. Once released from confinement, a prisoner on parole is not free from legal restraint, but is constructively a prisoner in the legal custody of state prison authorities until officially discharged from parole.' [Citations.] 'Clearly, the liberty of a parolee is "partial and restricted," [citations] [and] not the equivalent of that of an average citizen [citation].' [Citation.]" (*In re Taylor, supra*, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1037.)

The liberty interest of parolees is also lesser than that of offenders placed on probation. "A convicted defendant released on probation, as distinguished from a parolee, has satisfied the sentencing court that notwithstanding his offense imprisonment in the state prison is not necessary to protect the public. The probationer may serve a jail term as a condition of probation (§ 1203.1), but his probation is not a period of reintegration into society during which the same degree of surveillance and supervision as that deemed necessary for prison inmates is required. A parolee cannot claim an equivalent status. The imprisonment preceding his parole has come about just because he poses a significantly greater risk to society." (*People v. Burgener* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 532-533, disapproved on another ground in *People v. Reyes* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753.)

Thus, the private interest at stake here is a parolee's right to be free from the arbitrary or capricious deprivation of his or her conditional liberty.

Next, we consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this conditional liberty under the procedures employed, and the likely value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. (*Williams, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 659, citing *Mathews, supra*, 424 U.S. at p. 335.) DeLeon received written notice of the charges against him. A supervising parole agent and a judge promptly determined that the charges were supported by probable cause. DeLeon was appointed counsel, and counsel was furnished with the documentation supporting the charges. The charges were substantiated at an evidentiary hearing. Additional procedures were not constitutionally required to prevent an erroneous deprivation of DeLeon's conditional liberty.

DeLeon argues that due process requires a probable cause hearing of the revocation charge within 10 or 15 days of arrest. The prompt probable cause review of the charges and the parole violation report by a judicial officer as specified in section 1203.2, subdivisions (a) and (b)(2) guards against the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty pending a full hearing in parole revocation cases. Frequently, as in this case, the parole violation report contains a straightforward, albeit summary, description of the facts supporting the violation. When revocation proceedings were conducted by administrative agencies in the executive branch, as made clear in *Morrissey*, such documentary evidence was often sufficient to sustain a charged violation. (See *Morrissey, supra*, 408 U.S. at p. 489 [parole revocation "is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial"]; see also *In re Miller* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234–1235 [parole violations need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence].)

Traditionally, a probable cause determination in a criminal case is decided by a magistrate in a non-adversary proceeding upon hearsay and written testimony. (*Gerstein v. Pugh* (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 120 (*Gerstein*)). The purpose of such proceedings is not to resolve conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations. Rather the court determines whether the evidence supports "a reasonable belief in guilt." (*Id.* at p. 121.) Judicial review of the charges supporting revocation of parole achieves this same

purpose, and resulted in a finding in DeLeon's case of "probable cause to support a revocation and preliminarily revoke[] supervision."

The court in *Gerstein* distinguished the probable cause determination in a criminal case from the informal preliminary hearing to be given a parolee under *Morrissey* or a probationer under *Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra*, 411 U.S. 778, on the ground that in parole and probation cases evidence must be preserved for a "final revocation hearing [that] frequently is held at some distance from the place the violation occurred." (*Gerstein, supra*, 420 U.S. at pp. 121, fn. 22.) The basis for the distinction drawn by the court no longer applies to revocation of parole in our state. Revocation proceedings are now conducted by the California courts, not by administrative agencies, as they were in *Morrissey* and *Gagnon*, and hearings no longer occur at locations remote from the place of arrest, such as at a state prison.

Moreover, although there is no absolute right to counsel in parole revocation proceedings (*In re Michael I.* (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 462, 468), a right to counsel is afforded under the Realignment Act, and if a parolee facing revocation is indigent, a lawyer is to be appointed by the court. (§§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(2), 3000.08, subd. (f).) The appointment and assistance of counsel serves to guard against wrongful detention, and revocation of parole, on a meritless charge.

DeLeon says that a properly conducted probable cause hearing would afford the parolee a chance to meet with his attorney, give his attorney the names and addresses of the witnesses to subpoena for a revocation hearing, receive police reports, parole violation reports and a description of the exact charges. However, as we have said, DeLeon received notice of the charges, his counsel received the applicable reports, and nothing in the record suggests that Solano County's procedures prevent parolees' counsel from effectively representing their clients in revocation proceedings.

The procedures employed here, including prompt documentary review of the charges and supporting material by a judicial officer to determine whether probable cause existed, were sufficient to prevent an arbitrary deprivation of liberty pending a full

revocation hearing on the merits, and eliminate any significant risk of an erroneous determination.

The final *Mathews* factor considers the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal or administrative burdens that additional procedures may impose. (*Williams, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 660, citing *Mathews, supra*, 424 U.S. at p. 335.) Here, the government has an interest in the orderly and expeditious functioning of the courts, that includes conducting timely probation and parole revocation proceedings.

In 2014, the Judicial Council of California reported a need for an additional 300 judicial officers to adequately address the work in our superior courts. (Judicial Council of California, Court Statistics Report (2014) at p. 55; <<http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2014-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf>> [as of Oct. 28, 2015].) The report does not appear to reflect the additional workload demands placed upon the courts by the 2011 realignment legislation. Shortly before these responsibilities were transferred to the courts, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation reported that in 2010 more than 60 thousand parolees were returned to custody for violating parole. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, California Prisoners and Parolees 2010 (2011) at pp. 56-57; <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CALPRISd2010.pdf> [as of Oct. 28, 2015].) Under realignment, while parolees benefit significantly from having courts decide whether their parole should be revoked, the state faces additional administrative and fiscal challenges by increasing the role of the courts in these proceedings and requiring greater coordination between the executive and judicial branches.

We should be cautious before adding to these already substantial requirements by imposing further procedures not plainly mandated under the constitution. The current demands upon public resources suggest that a system for parole revocation be as expeditious as possible consistent with ensuring parolees facing revocation are not subjected to arbitrary or oppressive government action.

The important considerations in such cases require that parolees receive a timely determination of probable cause by a judicial officer followed by a full revocation hearing within a reasonable time. The probable cause hearings espoused by DeLeon that are to occur within 10 to 15 days of a parolee's arrest would further burden our overworked and under-resourced superior courts while adding little to the fair determination of revocation proceedings.

Here, DeLeon was promptly served with notice of the charges and the circumstances supporting them and his case was reviewed by a parole supervisor for probable cause. He was appointed counsel and his counsel was provided the documentation supporting the charges. The court made a probable cause determination within 15 days of his arrest, just two days after charges were filed with the court, and he was given what would have been a final revocation hearing within 20 days of his arrest but for his motion to dismiss. A full evidentiary hearing was held within 45 days of his arrest. *Morrissey* does not govern the measure of process due a parolee facing revocation before a court, but the revocation hearing must take place within a reasonable time of the parolee's arrest, and *Morrissey's* observation that a delay of up to two months "would not appear to be unreasonable" is instructive. (*Morrissey, supra*, 408 U.S. at p. 488.) While we recognize the importance of a prompt review when the state acts to deprive a parolee of his or her conditional liberty, the proceedings here were not unduly protracted and satisfied due process.

DeLeon's argument that a probable cause hearing within 15 days of his arrest was required by section 3044 is unpersuasive. Section 3044 is directed to the "Board of Parole Hearings or its successor in interest," and provides the procedural protections the agency must afford parolees facing revocation, "including a probable cause hearing no later than 15 days following his or her arrest for violation of parole." (§ 3044, subd. (a)(1).) But the superior court is not a successor in interest to the Board of Parole Hearings, an agency in the executive branch of government. Section 3044 does not apply to parole revocation proceedings conducted by the superior court.

Section 3044 was enacted by the voters as part of Proposition 9 in the general presidential election of 2008. Commonly known as “The Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy’s Law,” Proposition 9 was designed and intended to provide victims of crime with “rights to justice and due process,” and eliminate parole hearings in which there is no likelihood of an offender’s release. At the time section 3044 was enacted, the timing of parole revocation proceedings was governed by the stipulated order for injunctive relief in *Valdivia v. Brown, supra*, 956 F.Supp.2d 1125. Paragraph 11.d. of the injunction required notice of charges to be given to parolees within three days of a parole hold and probable cause hearings to be held no later than 10 days after parolees were served notice of charges. (*Id.* at p. 1128.) Thus, section 3044 operated to extend the time limit for probable cause hearings, not limit or shorten it. In this respect, nothing we do today frustrates the intent or purpose of the voters in enacting the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act, which was not to benefit parolees.

Unlike the Fourth District in *Williams, supra*, 230 Cal.App.4th 636, we decline to require two parole revocation hearings, or set strict time limits in parole revocation proceedings. The *Williams* court does not appear to have considered the reduced risk of an erroneous deprivation when the charges are promptly reviewed by a judicial officer as specified in section 1203.2 subdivisions (a) and (b)(2). The constitution does not mandate “an inflexible structure for parole revocation procedures.” (*Morrissey, supra*, 408 U.S. at p. 480.) Due process requires that revocation proceedings include reasonable safeguards against mistakes and proceed with reasonable diligence. Those requirements were met in this case.

III.

“[A] parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing.” (*In re La Croix* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154.) Here, as set forth above, DeLeon was afforded a timely revocation hearing with all the procedural protections afforded by

Morrissey for such a hearing plus the appointment of counsel. Thus, even if DeLeon was unconstitutionally denied a preliminary probable cause hearing, he suffered no prejudice.

Although his brief in this court argues prejudice, he makes no factual showing to support the claim. DeLeon does not suggest a possible meritorious line of defense that was foreclosed by the delay of any probable cause hearing, or facts that could have been raised at that hearing that would have required the charges to be dismissed. Instead, he suggests only that more objections to the prosecution's evidence might have been sustained had he been provided evidence and reports earlier than September 11 for the hearing convened on October 3.

We are not surprised that DeLeon cannot make a showing of prejudice. DeLeon's parole agent found a cell phone containing obscene images in DeLeon's motel room. DeLeon admitted the phone was his. Any violation of due process occasioned by the failure to hold a timely probable cause hearing in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (*In re La Croix, supra*, 12 Cal.3d at p. 155.)

DISPOSITION

The review of the reports and charges warranting revocation of parole by a parole supervisor, delivery of written notice of the charges to the parolee, prompt judicial review of the charges and supporting documentation by the superior court, reasonably prompt appointment of counsel and a hearing on the merits of the charges all lead us to conclude that there were adequate safeguards in place here to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of DeLeon's liberty for an undue period of time and to ensure his timely access to the courts. The order finding DeLeon in violation of parole and sentencing him to 180 days in custody is affirmed.

Siggins, J.

We concur:

Pollak, Acting P.J.

Jenkins, J.

Trial Court:

Solano County Superior Court

Trial Judge:

Honorable Robert S. Bowers

Roberta Simon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamalah D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald R. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Allen R. Crown, Allan Yannow, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.


EXHIBIT B

COPY

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE



THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALLEN DIMEN DELEON,
Defendant and Appellant.

A140050

(Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FCR302185)

BY THE COURT:

The petition for rehearing filed November 6, 2015 is denied.

Date: NOV 20 2015

Pollak, J. Acting P.J.

CERTIFICATE OF LENGTH


Re: *People v. Allen Dimen DeLeon*

A140050

I, Roberta Simon, counsel for Allen Dimen DeLeon, certify pursuant to the California Rules of Court that the word count for this document is 3,376 words, excluding the tables, this certificate, and any attachment. This document was prepared in Microsoft Word, and this is the word count generated by the program for this document.

I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 1, 2015, at Oakland, California.


ROBERTA SIMON
Attorney for Petitioner
Allen Dimen DeLeon

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

Re: *People v. Allen Dimen DeLeon*

A140050

I, the undersigned, declare that I am over 18 years of age and not a party to the within cause; my business address is P. O. Box 10728, Oakland, California 94610. My electronic serving address is rsarasimon@hotmail.com. On December 1, 2015, I served a true copy of the enclosed Petition For Review on each of the following, by placing same in an envelope addressed respectively as follows:

Office of the District Attorney
Solano County
675 Texas Street, Suite 4500
Fairfield, CA 94533
For Plaintiff,
The People of California

Allen Dimen DeLeon
c/o Michael Jue, Esq.
Office of the Public Defender
Solano County
675 Texas Street, Suite 3500
Fairfield, CA 94533
Defendant/Appellant

Honorable Robert Bowers
c/o Clerk, Solano County Superior Court
Hall of Justice
600 Union Avenue
Fairfield, CA 94533

Each said envelope was then sealed and deposited in the United States Mail at Oakland, California, with the postage thereon fully prepaid.

On December 1, 2015, I transmitted a PDF version of this document by electronic mail to each of the following using the email addresses indicated:


First District Appellate Project
Attention: Frances Ternus, Esq.
[Via TrueFiling]

Office of the Attorney General
[Via TrueFiling]
For Respondent,
The People of California

Court of Appeal, First Appellate District (Div. 3)
[Via TrueFiling]

I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 1, 2015, at Oakland, California.



DECLARANT